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25 April 1958

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED CHANGES IN U.S. POLICY
ON DISARMAMENT

GENERAL: We feel that dropping the "inseparativity" clause will make our position appear much more reasonable to both the Soviets and our allies.

I. Nuclear Provisions

The provisions of this section should convince the majority of our allies and uncommitted nations that we are striving for a sound and reasonable solution to the nuclear problem. The period of a test suspension should provide a clear opportunity for the rest of the world to judge whether the Soviet Union is sincere in its alleged desire for a relaxation of tensions. Furthermore, continued delay in the adoption of a test suspension by the U.S. provides additional opportunity for the USSR to withdraw from its unilateral suspension. If this were to happen, the USSR could then advance the argument that it was forced to withdraw by U.S. intransigence and "warmongering." This would give the USSR double propaganda mileage out of their unilateral test suspension.

We still feel that it would be to the advantage of the U.S. if we were to announce a short unilateral cessation of the production of nuclear material for weapons purposes. This would emphasize the importance which we place on cessation, and put pressure on the USSR on this issue. In view of the great future demand in the U.S. for nuclear material for peaceful purposes and the stock of nuclear weapons already available, we believe that the U.S. could take this action without jeopardizing U.S. security.

We recommend that the clause prohibiting transfer of nuclear weapons be dropped on the grounds that the Soviets probably have more reason to fear the transfer of nuclear weapons than we do.

II. Inspection Against Surprise Attack

Agreement on any or all of the inspection zones mentioned would materially improve the ability of U.S. intelligence to get advance warning of an impending Soviet attack. The gain on the Soviet side would not be as great because of the relatively greater openness of free-world areas. On the same grounds we strongly support the proposal for ground inspection posts beyond the limits of an inspection zone. Even a European Zone by itself would be a material gain to western intelligence. There would also be material gains from a European inspection zone in the form of greater western contact with European satellites and increased restriction of Soviet freedom of action in that area.

It should be noted that Governor Stassen first mentioned informally to the Soviets a zone running to 30° East. They responded with a counter-proposal to 25° East. Our later proposal of 35° East was regarded by them as not in keeping with this bargaining sequence.

III. Reductions of Armed Forces and Armaments

No Comment.

IV. Missiles and Outer Space

We believe that it would be highly desirable to place major emphasis on the positive aspects of the peaceful uses of outer space and reduce emphasis on or eliminate the section on the control aspects of the missile problem. In view of the newness of the missile art in general, and the rapid technological change inherent in the current state of the art, we question the definition of the missiles to be considered for control. It might well be that further study would show that some other definition might be more to the U.S. advantage. We do not know that this will be so, but feel that the problem is too important to allow the U.S. position to become fixed on the basis of the study done so far.

We also feel that a call for the elimination of missiles already fabricated is open to the same objections that we raise to the Soviet proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapons. Namely, we feel that both proposals are probably equally uninspectable. If our missile elimination proposal were accepted, the USSR might be able to retain a clandestine missile capability in view of their large supply of missiles already built. Furthermore, if we advance this proposal, the USSR might be able to say that we could equally well accept their proposal for the elimination of nuclear weapons. This we should avoid.

We feel that, in general, Soviet development of missiles is probably far ahead of the counterpart U.S. effort and that a cessation of missile development and testing in the next year or two might leave the USSR with an unacceptable advantage over the U.S. in its knowledge of the missile art.

V. Control Organization

No Comment.

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Since the establishment of the zones proposed for inspection against surprise attack is not contingent upon the acceptance of any other element of the United States disarmament program, the Department of Defense representative considers that the zone or zones proposed should be of such character and dimensions as to constitute a real contribution against great surprise attack. Either the US-USSR-Canada zone or the Arctic zone would, standing alone, meet this requirement. The Department of Defense representative recognizes that there is little likelihood that the Soviet Union would, in the near future, accept the US-USSR-Canada zone. He is of the opinion, however, that the recent Soviet protest in the United Nations and the attendant publicity would serve to enlighten public opinion as to the importance of the Arctic zone and to effect repeated Soviet contentions that the area is of no importance. He feels, therefore, that the United States should exploit this situation and in the event of a Summit meeting press the USSR for acceptance of this zone, either alone or in conjunction with a European zone.

It is the opinion of the Department of Defense representative that the Soviets would not accept a large European zone, involving a substantial portion of their territory, unless a sizable portion of the continental United States were also to be opened to inspection. A smaller European zone, as proposed in the Department of State paper, standing alone and unrelated to any other disarmament measure, would not constitute a realistic contribution toward the prevention of great surprise attack, since that would not affect the central sources for power capable of launching a nuclear attack. As to the dimensions and other characteristics of a European zone, the United States might tentatively fix upon the zone agreed to by our NATO Allies last summer (5 degrees to 35 degrees East) subject to revision following consultation with our Allies.

The Department of Defense representative considers the proposal in paragraph 3 for the establishment of ground control posts at agreed installations in the United States and the USSR to be unacceptable. The Department of Defense has consistently maintained that there must be effective inspection for every portion of every agreement affecting armaments signed by the United States. The separate ground control posts would violate that principle and would establish a pattern similar to that set up in Korea, which proved highly ineffective. Moreover it conforms closely to the type of inspection system repeatedly advocated by the Soviets and, once established, might be accepted by them as representative of our concept of an adequate inspection system. The Department of Defense representative considers it would be dangerous for the United States to advance or to accept such a proposal.

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informal suggestion

II. Inspection Against Surprise Attack

1. Upon the effective date of the agreement the parties concerned will promptly install and maintain, in an initial zone or zones specified in the agreement, an aerial and ground inspection system, including appropriate radar and communications equipment, to provide safeguards against the potential of surprise attack. Details of the aerial and ground inspection system will be prescribed in an annex to the agreement.

a. The US-Canada-USSR Zones

The United States will reaffirm its willingness to agree that all the territory of the Continental United States, all the territory of Canada and all the territory of the Soviet Union will be open to inspection.

b. The Arctic Zone

If the Government of the Soviet Union rejects the foregoing broad proposal, the United States will propose that all the territory north of the Arctic Circle of the Soviet Union, Canada, the United States (Alaska), Denmark (Greenland), and Norway; all the territory of Canada, the United States and the Soviet Union west of 140 degrees West longitude, east of 160 degrees East longitude and north of 50 degrees North latitude; all the remainder of Alaska; all the remainder of the Kamchatka Peninsula; and all all of the Aleutian and Kurile Islands will be open to inspection.

c. Inspection Zone Affecting Western Europe

Provided there is commitment on the part of the Soviet Union to one of the two foregoing proposals, the United States will propose, subject to full consultation with the Western European nations affected, that a European zone will be open to inspection.

d. Negotiations and arrangements for any aerial and ground inspection zone affecting Western Europe will be handled in a way enabling the Western European nations affected to have full voice in developing the position, especially as regards the following matters:

(1) Any provision as to the creation, extent and location of any such zone, or the types of inspection therein,

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(2) Any provision restricting states possessing nuclear weapons from locating such weapons within the area of any such zone.

(3) Any provision for such reduction in the armaments and armed forces in any such zone.

(4) Any provision for reduction of air bases in any such zone.

If the European nations affected propose the adoption of any such provisions, the United States will then decide on what position to take with regard to them.

2. Three months after the effective date of the agreement, the United States, USSR and other parties concerned will provide each other with inventories of fixed military installations and numbers and locations of military forces and major designated armaments (including nuclear weapons delivery capabilities but excluding nuclear weapons) located within an agreed inspection zone or zones.

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III. Reductions of Armed Forces and Armaments

To provide for initial reductions of armed forces and armaments the following measures:

1. Within a first phase agreement which includes the US-USSR-Canada zone or the Arctic zone, the US and USSR will each within one year from the effective date of the agreement:

- a. reduce its military forces to 2.2 million
- b. deposit, in internationally supervised storage depots within its own territory, the specific quantities of designated types of major armaments of types currently operational, substantial in amount, significant in kind, and of post-World War II manufacture (or naval vessels of types in active service), to be mutually agreed upon and set forth in the agreement.

2. Parties other than the USSR and the US will make reductions of forces and deposits of armaments or accept ceilings for their forces and armaments as appropriate to specific situations, as set forth in the agreement.

3. The first phase agreement should not spell out in detail any later phase reductions.

The US will, however, indicate its interest in further reductions of armaments and armed forces, on a basis to be agreed, as a second phase, taking into account progress towards solution of major political issues and satisfactory progress in fulfillment of other elements of the disarmament program. In that connection, the US -

- a. may discuss, without commitment, the possibility of reductions in a second phase, if first phase reductions are carried through successfully, to not less than 2 million men;
- b. may express hope that further reductions in armaments and armed forces might be negotiated, if second phase reductions are carried through successfully; provided that no floor below 1.5 million men is discussed.

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(Illustrative Section of Working Group Report)

I. NUCLEAR PROVISIONS

Proposed Changes

State

Defense or other proposals

Comments on Proposed Changes

State

Defense

AEC

CIA

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Special Assistant to the President